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'\ -'In a recent exchange, Friedman (1988) and McCallum (1988) took opposite
positions on the viability of nominal GNP targeting with a monetary base
instrument. Friedman questioned the appropriateness of a monetary base
instrument and, when he specified a nominal GNP growth equation with reserve
growth as an explanatory variable, he found that there was no significant
statistical association between the two variables. McCallum, however, re-
estimated the nominal GNP growth equation using a different measure of reserve
growth and found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that changes in
reserve growth temporally precede changes in nominal GNP growth. Friedman
used the total reserves series calculated by the Board of Governors, whereas
McCallum used a measure of adjusted total reserves calculated by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.11 The disparate results, and hence, the opposing
positions, apparently center on which reserve measure is used.ZI
In light of the exchange between Friedman and McCallum, the natural
question is: Which result does one believe? If the Board of Governor's
reserve measure is the correct one, then Friedman's conclusion seems
warranted. If, on the other hand, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
reserve measure is the correct one, then McCallum's recommendation deserves
further consideration. Apriori, there seems little reason to reject one
measure out of hand. The two respective Federal Reserve System institutions
adjust the total reserves aggregate for changes in reserve requirements and
season~l variation through different procedures. There does not appear to be
a reason to prefer one measure over the other. But, the evidence suggests
that the measure chosen may lead to diametrically opposite policy conclusions.
The purpose of this paper is to compare the two total reserve measures
in terms of their abilities to explain nominal GNP growth. The comparison
1involves a specification test. If the specification test indicates that the
two specifications are not statistically different from each other, then the
choice regarding which reserve aggregate to use when targeting nominal GNP
seems arbitrary. In this case, the evidence supporting a reserve or base
targeting procedure must be considered less favorable. The test for nonnested
specifications used here was developed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981).
I1. The Model
Following Friedman and McCallum, two separate reduced-form equations
relating nominal GNP growth to reserve growth are estimated. The primary
difference between each specification is that a different reserve measure is
used. One uses the Board of Governors measure. The other uses the St. Louis
measure. The general form of the model is given by
(1)
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where Ydenotes nominal GNP growth rate; R, the adjusted reserve growth rate
(either the Board or St. Louis); FG is the high-employment federal budget
surplus growth rate; and, <, a residual term.
Equation (1) differs slightly from the model specification adopted by
Friedman and McCallum. First, neither Friedman nor McCallum accounted for the
potential effects of fiscal policy. As equation (1) shows, the high-
employment federal budget surplus is included. Second, equation (1) permits a
very general lag structure for each of the separate explanatory variables.
Thornton and Batten (1985) provide evidence which suggests that policy
conclusions can be sensitive to the lag-length choice. Friedman and McCallum
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use one-quarter lags on both nominal GNP growth and reserve growth, without
providing much support for this particular specification. The final
prediction error (FPE) criterion developed by Akaike (1969) is used here to
determine the number of lags of each variable included in the specification.l/
III. Empirical Results
Table 1 reports the estimation of the model given by (1) for both
reserve measures using quarterly data from 19591 to 1989II.!/ The FPE
criterion indicates that one lagged value each of nominal GNP growth, adjusted
reserve growth and high-employment surplus growth should be included in the
specification. Moreover, the Breusch-Godfrey test is consistent with the
hypothesis that the residuals are not autocorrelated. The general
specifications estimated by Friedman and McCallum appear to be supported by
the data.~/
With the exception of the coefficients on the lagged values of the
alternative reserve measures, the coefficient estimates are generally similar
across the alternative specifications. Both coefficients on lagged nominal
GNP growth are statistically different from zero and about 0.25, while both
the coefficient estimates on the fiscal policy variable are similar in
magnitude and are not significantly different from zero. The estimated
coefficients on the lagged adjusted reserve measures, however, differ more
substantially across specifications. The coefficient in the St. Louis
speciffcation is positive and statistically different from zero.§/ In
contrast, the coefficient on the Board's adjusted reserve variable is not
statistically different from zero. Consequently, we conclude that the growth
in adjusted reserves, as measured by the Board, has no statistical association
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with nominal GNP growth. On the other hand, we find that variation in
adjusted reserve growth, as measured by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
bears a temporally leading association with nominal GNP growth. Thus, the
findings of Friedman and McCallum have survived the incorporation of fiscal
policy variables and the possible addition of longer lag lengths on each of
the explanatory variables.II
But, can we reject one of these specifications in favor of the other?
Given that (i) the St. louis specification has greater explanatory power
, (adjusted R
2 of 0.09 vs. 0.06), and (ii) the St. louis reserve measure is
statistically associated with future movements in nominal GNP growth and the
Board's measure is not, the data seemingly suggest that the St. louis
specification is superior. But, is the superiority statistically significant,
or is the difference between the two relationships statistically
indistinguishable?
To examine this question we performed the Davidson-MacKinnon J-test on
the two alternative specifications. The test is designed to make pairwise
comparisons of competing models. In the first case, we presume that the Board
specification is the null hypothesis (that is, the Board reserve measure is
presumed to be the monetary variable in the "true" model) and the St. louis
model is the alternative. In this case, the fitted values from the St. louis
specification are included as a separate explanatory variable in the Board
specification. The results from estimating this "augmented" equation are
given in the first column of Table 2. The only significant coefficient is
that on the variable representing the fitted value from the St. louis
equation. The coefficient on the Board adjusted reserve variable is negative,
but not different from zero at conventional levels. Under the null hypothesis
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that the Board reserve is the "true" model, the J-statistic equals 2.52, which
indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative St.
Louis specification.
Davidson and MacKinnon note that their test procedure is not necessarily
symmetric and suggest reversing the null and alternative hypotheses. The null
hypothesis in the second test presumes that the St. Louis specification is the
"true" null model and that the model with the Board reserve measure is the
alternative. The results for this test are reported in the second column in
Table 2. In this case, the coefficient on the variable representing the
fitted value from the Board model is negative, but not different from zero at
conventional significance levels. The J-test statistic is equal to -1.36
which does not reject the null model in favor of the alternative.~/
In short, the specification test provides evidence that the model with
the St. Louis reserve measure is statistically superior in explaining
movements in nominal GNP behavior than the Board model.
IV. Conclusion
Evidence is presented that rejects the hypothesis that the Board
adjusted reserve series is preferred to the St. Louis adjusted reserve series
in terms of explaining nominal GNP growth. The hypothesis that the St. Louis
measure is better than the Board measure, however, is not rejected. Thus,
insofar as explaining nominal GNP growth is concerned, the results presented
in this paper suggest that the St. Louis adjusted reserve series is superior
to the Board adjusted reserve series. Consequently, the evidence supports
McCallum's conclusion that the choice of the reserve measure used matters in
evaluating monetary policy rules. Indeed, the conclusion regarding the merits
5of nominal GNP targeting using a reserve rule hinge on whether one uses the
St. louis measure or the Board's measure of adjusted total reserves.
:-1
6FOOTNOTES
1. Officially, the Board's measure is called total reserves adjusted for
changes in reserve requirements. Gilbert (1983) provides a thorough
discussion of the differences between these two measures.
2. Friedman also estimated the equations with both the Board and St. Louis
monetary base measures and found that the Board base measure does not
"substantially affect McCallum's results." He interprets the evidence
from this comparison as verification that changing from the Board
measure to the St. Louis measure of the monetary base does not
substantially alter the results of McCallum's simulation. Haslag and
Hein (1989), however, prOVide evidence which suggests there is a
statistical difference between the two measures in terms of their
respective abilities to explain movements in nominal GNP growth.
3. Hsiao (1981) developed the multivariate approach for selecting lag
length. Essentially, this procedure identifies an order for choosing
the explanatory variables, as well as choosing the "optimal" lag-
length.
4. The growth rates are calculated as follows:
(xt - xt _l ) / [(xt + xt • , ) /2],
where xt denotes the explanatory variable. The St. Louis adjusted
reserve series is calculated as the difference between adjusted monetary
base and the currency component of M1 (i.e., currency in the hands of
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the public). The Board estimates seasonal factors separately for both
currency in the hands of the public and total reserves. Consequently,
the Board's total reserve series is used. The Federal Reserve Bank of
St. louis provided the adjusted monetary base data. Nominal GNP, the
high-employment government budget surplus, the currency component of Ml
and the Board's total reserve series adjusted for changes in reserve
requirements are obtained from the Citibase data bank. All data are
seasonally adjusted.
5. One lag on the fiscal policy variable is included (under the assumption
that at least one lag is appropriate), but the coefficient on this
variable is estimated to be not significantly different from zero.
Omitting the fiscal policy measure from the specification does not alter
the main conclusions of this paper.
6. The long-run elasticity of nominal GNP growth with respect to a one-
percentage-point increase in adjusted reserves is estimated to be only
0.26 with the St.louis adjusted reserve measure. This differs from the
estimate of the long-run elasticity, which is equal to 0.67 when the St.
louis adjusted monetary base is used. The constrast is sharpened when
we consider that long-run elasticity is not significantly different from
one when the monetary base is specified, but is significantly less than
one, but greater than zero when St. louis adjusted reserves are
specified. With the Board's adjusted reserve measure, the long-run
elasticity of nominal GNP growth is equal to 0.14, and is not
statistically different from zero. The long-run elasticities are
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statistically different when the monetary base is used in the nominal
GNP specification as compared to adjusted reserves. Thus, contrary to
McCallum's claim, the empirical findings suggest that reserves and
monetary base measures are different in terms of their respective
abilities to explain nominal GNP growth.
7. Atest to determine if the models are stable over the entire sample was
also performed. Because of the reforms introduced in the Monetary
Control Act of 1980, 19801 is identified as potential join point. The
test statistics from the Chow test are equal to 0.55 and 0.87 for the
models with St. Louis reserves and Board reserves, respectively. The
evidence, therefore, suggests that both of the relationships are stable
over the sample period.
'.
8. Sawa (1978) presents an alternative methodology to compare nonnested
specifications, which does not suffer from the potential asymmetries
present in the Davidson-MacKinnon procedures. Sawa uses information
criterion as a measure of the distance from the competing specifications
and the "true" specification. Using the Bayes decision rule, the test
amounts to which specification yields a lower value of the information
criteria. As in the Davidson-MacKinnon procedure, the BIC is smaller
for the specification with the St. Louis reserve measure than with the
90ard reserve measure (-740.76 vs. -735.81). Thus, the information
criterion suggests that the specification with the St. Louis adjusted
total reserves is superior.
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Reduced-form Nominal GNP Equations




















Test Statistic F= 1.26 0.97
(includes 4 lagged values)
*Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.




Reduced-form Nominal GNP Equations
Used for Nonnested Test of Models
(1/1959 - IV/1988)
Null Hypothesis
Variable Board Model St. Louis Model
Intercept -0.294 1.587*
(0.401) (0.726)










2 ? 0.107 0.107
Breusch-Godfrey
Test Statistic 1.58 1.58
(includes 4 lagged values)
J-Test 2.52 -1.36
*Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
Standard error of the estimate in parentheses.
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